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Thesis.

Constructive Notice
and
Its Effect on the Law of ConveyingT Real Estate.
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It
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frequently happens during the i,,any and rapid

transactions of business,

hat two or more persons in

good faith, acquire equal rights in the same subject
matter, and courts are called upon to decide wihich shall
have the priority, and which shall bear the loss.
These two old and well settled maxims are cal led to
their aid ; "Where the equities are equal the law provails", and,

"Where the equities are equal the first in

order of time prevails."
In the determination of these controversies the law
of notice plays a very important part.

It is regarded

throurhout the rhiole range of jurisprudence,
cisive element in these controversies,

as a de-

whether the party

asking relief acted ,,ith or without notice of the claims
of others in or over tie same subject matter.
It is a well settled principle that a purchaser
with notice that the subject matter of the tansaction
is effected by some claim in favor of a prior third party,
While on the oth) or hand

takes subject to that claim.
it

is equally well settled, that, if he took without

notice,

of any such preceeding claim he \ill

tected against such claim.

be pro-

Notice may be either act-

ual or constructive.

It is the purpose of this article to deail only with
the latter and its effect on the law of conveying real
es tate.

The tenis used to define constructive notice

are many and varied as inplied,
and even actual notice.

iputed, presumptive,

Chief Baron Eyre defines it

thus,

"constructive notice I take to be in its nature no

more than evidence of notice, the presumption being so
violent that the court will not allow it to be contradicted."

Judge Selden defines it

as beinr,

inference from established facts, and

"A legal

,ike other legal

presuiiptions does not admit of dispute."

These and

many other similar expressions are the ones usually
adopted by judges and text-writers.
a littl

Yet they seem to be

e short of what seems to me the true theory.

not constructive notice,

Is

in its technical sense rather,

"The legal cogmizance of a

fact or facts, -,ihich the

law imputes to a party" 9

Therefore it has nothing to

do with actual knowledge, nor is it
trine of evidence.
of knowl ede.

founded on any doc-

It does not rest on any presumIption

The theory is not that the party is pre-

suned to know,but by intenmiont of law he does know,
that is,

he stands as though he had actual knowledge.

These numerous definitions,

together with an attempt

by many text-writers and judges to distinguish between
constructive and implied notice,

tend to involve the

dostrine of notice in much confusion.
Story on his work on Equity at section 410 a makes
such a distinction,

by placing notice by registaIy and

lis pendens as constructive,

but notice by possession,

to agents, and other other similar classes he calls
ixpl ied notice.
Wade,in his work on notice, carries the same idea
to a limited extent.

They give as the reason for the

distinction, that in the latter cases,
is one of fact and can be disputed.

the presoription
Ma ile on the other

hand, Pomroy , in his work on Equity,classes them all

as constructive noi-Ace.

This seeis bo be +he best and

truest classifica tion.
Story and Wade,

in their reasoning, seen to leave

out of consideration the fact that in what they term
implied notice,

it

is

only the facts on which the notice

rests, that are open to dispute, and when once they are
proven to exist, the notice that the law raises is as
conclusive as in cases of record.

In the latter cases

the fact of the existence of +he records,

and whethe

or

not the instrument was properly recorded, are open to
dispute.

Therefore I claim they should both be placed i

in the swme class.

When the facts are once established

and the relation of the parties is such as to bring them
within the operation of the law of constructive notice,

the notice itself presents a pure question of law for
the court to pass upon.

Williamson vs.

Brown,

15 N. Y.

5l9 ; Warden vs. Williams,

24 11.

ford, 21 111.J.

Roland vs. 11irt, 6 Ch. App.678.

Eq. 217 ,

67 ; Jones vs.

Brain-

Constructive notice seems to arrange itself into
the following classes or branches :
1st. Notice arising out of records.

To this class

belongs tnie Registry law and Lis Pendens.
2nd. Notice arising from the parties'

personal re-

lation to the transaction, such as possession by an

adverse claimant, and from title papers.
3rd. Notice arising out of the parties' constructive
relation to the transaction, as by agents or attorneys.
These will be treated in the order named.

L
a ws .
Laws.

Registry

In the case of Jackson vs. Burgot, 10 Johns. 461,
Ch. Kent said in effect, that the policy whjich applies
the doctrine of constructive notice to the registry of
of deed and other instruments,
fraud.

is to protect against

The policy arrived at being to accomplish

through constructive notice, the same results which would
be obtained thrott,(h actual notice.

Hence these records

were to furnish a means whereby a purchaser or incumbrancer could obtain reliable information, as to the
condition of his grantor's or mortgagor's title ; and
to give a g{rantee a chance to protect his title, by
placing it

on record,

against the subsequent acts of his

grantee or third persons.
to the comnon law,

and is

This is a matter never knoim
regulated entirely by statute.

8
In England there is

no general registration act, but

for sertain local reasons there were passed as early as
the bemnning of the last century,statutes

registration in certain counties.
8 Geo.II,

Ch. G ; 6 Anne,

These statutes were

Oh.

,

regulating

2 & 3 Arnne Oh. 120,

35.

in most cases, simply directi-

tory, and provided in substance that a memorial of all
conveyances may be recorded in a prescribed manner.
In some cases i'V was provided that such conveyances,
not recorded,

should be void against a subsequent re-

corded conveyance.

Nothing is

record ac-ing as notice to an,

said in any case of the

one.

And the courts .

in constructing theri, have given them no such application.

Wayatt vs. Bradwell , 6 Ves.

Stambridge,

3 Vest.

477.

4515 ; Jollant vs.

S t :;

9
The reason why England did not pass registry law
can be accounted for, by their peculiar mode of conveyancing by livery of seizin, which was a public notorious acts of which every body was supposed to take
notice.

This can also be assigned as a reason for the

absence of recording, acts in the civil law of Rome.
Their formal conveyance by copper and scales was a public
act ; and later wnen done by simply delivery a man in
possession would be looked upon as the ower.
In the United States the legislatures and courts
have always favored the registration of instruments of
conveyance.

Long before the Revolution,the. colonies of

Massachusetts and New York had passed registration acts.
In 1710 the colony of New York passed an act providing
for the recording of deeds,

and in 1754 an

act providing

for the registry of mortgages was passed.

These were
The y

among the first general registration acts passed.

were perpetuated by the Constitution of 1777, and ,vith
their various revisions, repeals, re-enactmrents,

and

amendients have reil:aned in force to the present day.
Since these acts every state has passed similar acts.
In construing these various acts,

the courts of the

various states differ with respect to the details. They
are, however,

agreed that, if

an instru~ient of convey-

ance or incumbrance be properly recorded,

the record im-

parts constructive notice to subsequent purchasers or
incmnbrances,

of the instrument and its contents,

the time the original is left for record.
Notice,

Ch.

II,

Part II

from

Wade on

; Pomroy on 1,q. Jur. sec. 646.

They also practically agree that the instrument

must be,

first, an instrument effecting, either the legal

or equitable title to real estate.
is void, the record is void.

If the instritient

Second, such an instrument

as is a proper subject for record.

Nothing car be

gained by recording an instrument which is not the proper
subject of record.

Third, it must be properly recorded,

.In the sense that it must show that the statutes regulating execution, acknowledgment and so on have been complied with.

Parker vs.

Hill, 8 I'etc.447 ; Washburn vs.

Burnham 63 1T. Y. 132 ; Zeigler vs.
Pring le vs.

Shower,

'78 Pa. St.3 57;

Dun;., 37 Wis. 449 ; Galphin vs. Abbott,

6 iich. 17.
As to the extent that clerical errors or willful
misconduct of the recorder may effect the constructive
notice the authorities are in conflict.

Some courts

hold that if the instruent be left with the proper
officer, and it
title it

has in itself all the requisites to en-

to a valid registry that grantee or mortgagee

has done all in his power and shall not be held by reason
of the omissions or mistakes of the recorder.

Franklin

vs.

Cannon I Root (Conn.)

19,

III. 486 ; Nichols vs. Rengolds, 1 R.I. 30.

580 ; Merrich vs.

Wallace

Other courts hold that the subsequent purchaser or
incutmbrancer is only to be conclusively notified of what
the record actually recites.

In other words he need

not go back to see if the instruments were properly
spread on the record books.

Barnard vs.

Chapmjn, 29

Iiich. 162 ; Pringle vs.

Dunn. Supra.; Jenninggs vs. Wood

2 Ohio, 261 ; Frost vs.

Beeohiian, 18 Johns.

Dunham,2 Johns.

These two last cases are ]ead-

Ch.413.

ing cases on this subject.

544; Dey vs.

13
In the Dey case a deed absolute on its face,

but intended

for a mortgage, was recorded as a mort gaffe held to impart
no not,ice as a mortgage.
In the Frost case a mortgage for $3,000. was recorded as one for $300. held tat it was notice only to the
extent of $300. This seems like a hard rule that a grantee
is to be held for the acts or misconduct of an officer
over whom he has no control.

True he has a remedy against

the officer, but inmany cases this is vastly inadequate.
But the courts say these statutes are in derrogation
of cojmmon law rights,

and must be strictly construed.

Our registry officers are simply ministerial and may
record any instrtunent left for record, but nothing. can
be gPained by recording an improper instrument.

Where

the conveyance is involuntary, as by a sheriff's deed,

the whole proceedings is in derrogation of the comnon
law ript6 and is provided for by statute.

There f ore

the whole of the statute must be complied with,

and

equi ty will not aid +,he execution of such powers.
Demning, vs.

Smith, 3 John. Ch. :344; Atkins vs. Kennell,

20 Wend. 241.
Another important consideration is that the record
of conveyance is only notice to subsequent parties claimirg, under or throuvh the same grantor, by whom the recorded conveyance was executed.
A recorded conveyance from one straner to the
title to another stranger will not effect a party who
claims under a different grantor.

Huthington vs. Clark,

30 Pa. St. 393 : Page vs. Waring, 7( '.
vs.

Simpson, 11 N. J.

Eq. 24,9.

Y. 463 ; Losey

In the latter case the Chancellor say'ing,

"When one

link in the chain of title is wanting, there is nothing
to guide the purchaser to the next succeediar
which the title is continued.
an individual,

link by

When he traces down to

out of whom the title is not carried by

the record the registry acts makes that title

the piir-

chaser's protection."
The often quoted expression that the record is
notice to

the world is

The true rule is

as erroneous as it

that it

is notice only to subsequent

parties claiming under the same grantor.

add the words,

is misleading.

Some statutes

in good faith and for a valuable consider-

ation, and where these do not appear in the statute they
have been added by the courts.

1,i

s

Pendens

.

The doctrine of lis pendens is one of very early

origin.

Lord Bacon,

down the rule,

in one of 'As early ordinances,

laid

"No decree bindeth any that cometh in

bona fida, by conveyance from the defendant,

before the

bill is exhibited, and is made no party by bill or order;
but when he cometh in pendente lite,

and while the suit

is in full prosecution, and without any color or privity
of coult,

then regularly the decree bindeth.

But, if

there were any intermissions of suit, or the court is
made acquainted witi the conveyance,
give order according to justice."
II,

the court is to

Bacon's Works, Vol.

479.
Chancellor Kent,

1 John. Ch.,

in the case of lurray vs.

Bellow,

thinks this one of the earliest promulga-

17

tions of the rule,

and adds that it

ported down to the present time.

has been full,, supThe foundation of the

rule seems to be the prevention of litigation.
is a difference of opinion amoi

text-,,writer

There
and judges

as to whether it operates by reason off the doctrine of
constructive notice or by reason of the piblicity of
courts and their proceeding , together with the fact that
the lavi will not allow the parties pending the litigation to give other parties rights to the property in
dispute, so as to prejudice the other.

This latter

doctrine is advocated by Dight C. in the case of
Hobrook vs.

1T. J. Zinck Co. 57 U. Y.

worth in case of Bellemy vs.

Sabine,

,

and by Lord CranI De G. & J.

While on the other hand, Story, Wade,

566.

Kent and

other writers apply the doctrine strictly on the ground

of notice.

The courts and mariy of the statutes on the

subject apply it with the sane effects as constructive
notice. At coji.nnn law the doctrine seemed to be that, if
after the filing of the bill and issuimn, of the subpoena,
a person purchased the property from one of the litigants
it would be bound by the decree of the court.

Af ter

the establishment of registry laws and under the reform

proce dure acts,

the whole doctrine has been chand and

made s tatutory.
In New York the eourt of Civil Procedure sec. 16701675 provides for the filing of a notice of ]is pendens
in the Bounty Clerk's office.
cerninp: real estate.

The suit must be one con-

The pla intiff may,

complaint, file with it

on filing his

a notice as prescribed by law.

This notice shall be recorded and will ac±
ive

as construct-

notice to purchaser or incuilbrancer of the property,

durir

the litigation.In most if not all of the states

the doctrine of lis pendens has become a pure matter of
statute, which if
comlon law.

followred,

Hive the same result as at

The doctrine in its

technical

coimmon law

sense was a harsh one and one not favored by the courts.
In the case of Leitch vs. Wells, 48 8.Y. 585- Earl C.

in

coimenting on the doctrine said,"It has always been considered a hard rule and will be applied only when the
case is actually brought within it,
in the proceeding,

and if a slip is made

the court will not aid in rectifying

the jistake. Hard and unjust as the rule may at times
seem,

if

constructive notice were not applied there would

be no certainty that litigation would ever cease.

It is

from the consideration of public policy, as well as the
protection of the rights of the parties themselves that
the law charges a party witli notice by a record to the

same extent and with the same consequences as though he
had actual knowledge.
Notice by Possession.
The general rule is well settled both in this countr

and En~land that open, notorious,

and exclusive

possession of real estate is constructive notice to those
dealing subsequently with the estate, of the interest of
the one in possession, whether such interest be legal or
equitable.
The leading English case on this subject is that of
Taylor vs.

Stebbert, 2 Ves.

437, decided in 1794 by

Lord Rosslyn, and followed by the case of Holmes vs.
Powell,

8 De G. 1i. & G. 72, where the rule was clearly

and accurately stated by J.

C. Knight-Bruce in the fol-

lowing language : "I apprehend that by the law of England,
when a man is of right and de facto in possession of a

corporeal heriditiment, he is entitled to impute knowledie of thct possession to all who del for any interest
in the property conf] icting or inconsistant ,iith the
title or alleged title under which he is in possession
or has a right to couple with his possession".
The case of Brown vs. Volkeninc 64 U. Y. 76 states
the rule as applied in this country substantial] y as it
is applied in England.

The English courts say that the

possession must be open, visible, notorious, and under a
claim of right or ownlership.
In the cases of this country, the adjectives used
or at least of the same import.

A

fair sample are those used in the case of Brown vs.

Vol-

are about the same,

keninF,

supra.

Tfich

are, "that the possession must be

actual open, visible and inconsistant wi th the record

of the apparent owner by the records ; not equivocal,
occasional,

)on-

nor for a special or temporary purpose.

structive possession is not enough."
As to the possession of a tenant of the vrantor,
there is a diversity of opinion in the country.
Erland it

seems well settled that it

of the tenancy ; that is,

it

In

is sinply notice

is notice only of the inter-

est or title of the actual accupant.

Barnhart vs.

Greenshield, 28 Eng. L. & Eq. 77; 2 Sug. on Vendors,

sec. 762 -3

; Wade on notice p. 121.

In New York the clear weight of authoritr is

-hat

a

the possession must be actual.

Brown vs.

Volkening.

In

that case a key to unfinished dwell ing houses was delivered to the purchaser,

and it

was held not to be such

a delivery of possession as would give a bona fida in-

cumbrancer notice of the interest of the purchaser.
In California possession by a tenant is held to be
notice even of the land-lord's title.
In Hodgin's Executors vs.

Aminerman, 40 '7. J. Eq. 99,

it was held that actual residence on the land was not
necessary, but as in the case wh ere t)he land was used for
a meadow, and defendant had kept the lenses in repair,
he would be protected against the lien of a judgnent rendered arainst his grantor after the giving, but before
the recording of the deed.
In Fassett vs.

Smith, 23 N. Y. 256,

it was held that

the possession of +he wife's land by the husband was
sufficient to put the purchaser on enquire as to the
wife's title.

These are fair samples of what the

courts hold to be sufficient possession to put subse-

24

quent parties on enquire as to what the inferest of the
party in possession is.
In Iviassachusetts the statute declar,,s that nothing
but actual notice will suffice to invalidate a subsequent recorded conveyance,

and that it

cannot be pre-

suned from open and notorious possession, even when the
subsequent party had actual knowledge of the possession.
He can abide by the result of an examination of the
records.
vs.

Sibleyr vs. Leffinvell, 8 Allen 584 ; Pomeroy

Stevens, II Iietc. 244.
It appears to be well settled in England that

possession of a tenant is not only notice of the rirhts
and interests arising out of the tenancy,

but is

also

notice of subsequent rights acquired during the tenancy.
Danials vs.

Davinson, 16 Ves.

249.

In this case -'he

subsequent rig~ht was an w,)eementto purchase.

'Chi s has

been extended to all persons in possession. Pmrn.

Jur. sec. 616.

Aq.

This is also the rule in NIew York.

Reed vs. Garron, 50 1i.

Y. 345 ; Parker vs.

Connor, 93

IT.Y. 118.
Yet there are courts which hold that possession
began under one right is not notice of any other subsequent acquired ri!,ht.
Taking the theory of this doctrine as established
by the best authority and the la+,er rule can not hold;
because possession is enoufgh to put one on enquire and

h\
he is

bound by, what he discovers or iiot

by a diligent enquire.

have discovered

otice from Title Papers.
At the present

t

mne purchasers or incit,ibrancers

generally rely on the public records for information in
regard to titles.

If from such records these appear

a connected chain of titles by a succession of deed from
the greneral government down to his granter, he can safely rest, unless he ('iscovers that there is an outstanding equity in favor of some third person.
In Enpgland, when titles are conveyed by a long line
of title deeds, the absence of one is sufficient to put
him on enquire as to

hy it

is missing.

It is an in-

dication of an outstanding interest secured by the absent
deed.

This method of conveyancing and creating lines

is practically never used in this country ; yet Pomeroy
says the principle still exists and will be applied in

analagous cases.

The most coJmuon wav of

by title

by i'ecitals contained in them.

papers is

Whenever a purchase', or
veyance,

and is

of conveyances,

iTivirg notice

incumibrancer hold under a con-

obliged to make out his title

by a series

the rule is well established that he has

constructive notice of all matters which appear,
by recital,

reference,

or 6therwise,

either

on the face of any

out his chain of title.

instrument necessary to make

Such purchaser charged with notice in this manner,

of any trust, subject to which
grantor was held,

the legal title

takes subject to such trust and holds

as trustee for the beneficiary whose interest is
closed by the title

of his

papers,

dis-

or facts to which their re-

citals would load an enquirer of ordinary diligence.
Therefore,

if

a deed recites or refers to another

transaction in relation to the same subjlect mat Per,

the

purchaser shall be deemed !o have cons truc tive notice of
such transaction.
Acer vs.

Oliver vs.

Pratt, 3 How.

333 ;

Wescott, 46 1'. Y. 384 ; Cambridge vs.

Delano,

48 N. Y. 384.
This doc t rine applies also where the facts recited
are in regard to equitable and not legal interest. Acer

vs. Wescott, 1 Lans. 193.

It has been applied to

statutory conveyances, as a sale on execution.

conveyance is declared to consist of the judgmient,

The
levy,

sale, and sheriff's deed, each of which is an essential
requisite to a valid conveyance.

Upon the val idicy

of these constituents the purchaser must depend for his
ti tl e.
In the case of Nelson vs.

Allen, I Ya,- 'e)
(

360,

when the record of the decree was ex',)nned,

it

was found

that the judgpent was invalid for want of jurisdiction of
the court.

The pr-chasers :.ere held charreable with

constructive notice of the above fact, as the decree was
part of his chain of title.
The lien of a vendor for pirchase price has always
been favored by the courts of qquity.
force it

They will en-

if the purchaser, by reference to the title

instruments of his grantor, might have learned that a
former conveyance was on credit.

enquire whether such has been paid.
Blackwell , 3 B. ,,on. 67.

It

is his duty to
Executors vs.

Thi s do ctrine is often applied

when the title is claimed througlh a will.
ly, 7 Paige 421,

In Farris vs.

a testator devised his land to a son

and grave his dauiter a legacy payable by the son.

The real estate was held to be incunbered by the legacy,
and a subsequent p;rchaser f,'om the son wai chargfed with
notice that the legacy had not been paid.

The same

rule was applied in the case of i,'IcTeeter vs. i'jicullen,
2 Pa. St. -32 ; Bell as vs. Lloyd, 2 Watts 401.
It has been said that the recitals must be certa,in
and explicit, but the better rule sems to be that they
need only be reasonably clear.

The courts say that is

certain which can be made certain. (Cases supra.)

A

second mortgagee always has notice of a prior mortga(e

mentioned in his mortgagor's deed.
21 tich.

Rake- vs.

,Iatthiews,

l

As to the remoteness of a conveyance that will bind
a purchaser by its recitals, the rule seems to be that
he has constructive notice of all instruments in

Miis

chain of title to which an examinaliion would lead.
in Bush vs. Ware,

l-' Pet. 93 , it

was

decided

t hat

But
he

need not go back of a grant from the general government.
These classes of constructive notice like others never
operate between the immediate parAes,

but only between

a purchaser and some prior party claiming an interest
I

Pomeroy Eq. Jur.

sec. 63 ; Wade on ',oAce,

p. 143.

Theyr seev:m to operate as by estopple and negligpence.
If a third party is in possession or a title instrument recites a fact, it

is

,;ross negligence for the

purchaser or incumibrancer not to follow up the clue,
which he has discovered.

Therefore he mill not be

heard to deny the interest of the third party.

Notice to Agents.
eonstructive notice in that class of cases where an
agent has actual knowledge is a question that has been
much mooted and discussed by text-writers and judges
both in this country and England.

There is a great di-

versity of opinion as to the principles of law on Jhich
it

rests.

Many writers insist that it

tive notice at all, but imputed notice.

is not construc'Me distinc-

tions that they draw are refined and scholarly, yet to
an ordinary lawyer they only tend to confuse the law and
involve him in hopeless confusion.
There -iere attempts in England as early as the
seventeenth century to lay down a rule, but oring to the
poor reporting, it
they did. decide.

is almost impossible to find out what

The cases of Lowther vs. Carlton, 2 Atk. 242;
Warrick vs. Warrick, 3 Atk. 294 ; and Le Ileve vs.
11eve,

Le

3 Atk. 648, decided by Lord Hardwick, laid down

the rule,

that only such knowledge of the agent effects

the principle as is acquired in the same transaction.
This rule was law in England until the decision of Desser
vs. Norwood,

17.

C. B. (Iu.S.)

L. R. 6 (lh. App. 678,

466,

and Rowland vs.

Hart,

aboit twenty-five years ago when

Hardwick was overruled.

So now the rule is that if

the agent, at the time of the transaction, has knowledge
of any prior lien, trust or fraud, affecting the subject
matter, no matter how obtained,
thereby.

If he acquired it

fact that he retains it will
of the case.

his principle is effected

before the ptrchase,

the

depend on the circumstances

The doctrine seems to rest on the rule of law, that
what knowledge the agent has of the subject matter of
the transaction, he is bound to disclose it to his
principal except where it would be a breach of professional confidence reposed in him by another.

This

rule is the one followed in the United States Supreme
Court.
The Distilled Spirits case, 17. Wall.

3)U.

our state courts there is a conflict as to what the rule
is.
rule.

The courts of Pennsylvania follow the Hardwick
Bracken vs. h-iiller, 4 W. & S. 110.

York the rule is laid down in Holden vs.

In New

U. Y. & E. Bk.

72 I. Y. 286, a case in which a bank was held bound by
knowledge obtained by

its president when he was not

acting in such capacity.

In the late case of Slatterly vs.

Schnanneck, 44

HIn,. 7', it was held that by the rule in Holden case,
A4t;

a

holder of a mortgage would be bound by knowledge

imparted to his agent if

the knowledr,,e was present in

the mind of the agent at time of transaction.

The re-

fore the rule in New York seems to be the same as the
late rule in Enland and United States.
The other states are more or less divided as to
which is the true rule.

Concl

us ion.

Though at time the application of the rules which
govern constructive notice, works seeming hardship and
injustice,

yet we have but to remmiber that it has for

its foundation a broad principle of public policy and
protection to innocent third parties, and much of its
seeming hardship and injustice will vanish.
True the party that suffers is not alkiays the one
really in fault, but in a majority of the cases where
this doctrine is applied to the detriment of an apparent
innocent party, if
examined,

the surrounding circumstances be

it will be found that the sufferer was not

quite as diligent and careful as he should have been.
There will continually appear some seeming insignificant
fact, wich if

followed up will show some want of cau-

tion or diligence, some neglect of duty,
to gain a little

or some desire

advantagre over an unsuspecting neipghbor.

If the doctrine was not applied to these cases,

the hard-

ship and injustice would be much more patent.
There+ore,

my conclusion is,

that the rules which

govern constructive notice are as fair and equitable
as any rules can be, which have for their object equal
justice and the govermment of a selfish people.

